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Apresentação
Recebemos com grande satisfação Doreen Massey,
professora da Open University, que veio para
contar a experiência de Londres em urbanismo
através das últimas décadas de tensões políticas e
econômicas da era neoliberal.
Doreen Massey tem uma longa trajetória de
pesquisa e ensino ligada à Open University – uma
universidade de cursos por correspondência, que
já formou mais de um milhão de alunos – em que
ocupou por muito tempo o cargo de chefe do
Departamento de Geografia. Tem uma rica
produção de publicações, de mais de uma dezena
de livros e inúmeros ensaios e artigos, alguns
desses últimos publicados também no Brasil,
notadamente na revista Espaço & Debates. A sua
resenha-crítica de David Harvey: Justiça social e a
cidade, reputo ser um primor de crítica, aliando
rigor infalível com avaliação generosa. Finalmente,
ela tem experiência direta em planejamento
urbano – no caso, de Londres, precisamente – em
duas situações históricas distintas: como assessora
da Greater London Council, na qualidade de
membro da London Entreprise Board, que
elaborava a política econômica da GLC, e mais
recentemente, como assesssora do Green Party
para uma avaliação crítica da versão preliminar da
ondon world city in
the context of uneven
development
Palestra proferida como professora convidada na
disciplina AUP 840: O mercado e o Estado na
organização da produção capitalista (2002)
Professor responsável: Csaba Deák
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Professora da
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estratégia de desenvolvimento da London
Development Authority.
O título da palestra era originalmente The London
experience in neo-liberalism, que acabou sendo
alterado por sugestão da própria palestrante para
London world city in the context of uneven
development, um título mais ativo, talvez, que o
primeiro, que mais sugere uma mera reação ao
neoliberalismo. De todo modo, o tema em sua
forma mais geral talvez pudesse se definir como
urbanismo na era do neoliberalismo, razão pela
qual gostaria de lembrar aqui a origem e a história
do liberalismo, que perpasssa a história do próprio
capitalismo.
O liberalismo é essencialmente o postulado da
primazia do indivíduo sobre a sociedade, do
mercado sobre o Estado. A forma política que lhe
corresponde é a democracia, baseada na
igualdade formal entre os indivíduos (“todos são
iguais perante a lei”) e governada pela “mão
invisível” do interesse individual. Essa ideologia
predomina em todo o primeiro estágio do
capitalismo, de crescimento galopante e
desenfreado. Com a crise desse, pela exaustão de
mais lugar para expansão após a colonização do
mundo inteiro pelo fim do século 19 – esse
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momento poderia ser visto como o início da
globalização – o capitalismo mudou de caráter. O
progresso técnico se tornou primordial, uma vez
que o aumento da produtividade do trabalho ficou
sendo o único recurso para ampliar a produção de
mercadorias, aliado à elevação do nível de
subsistência, e com esse, dos níveis de consumo.
A forma política correspondente a esse estágio,
denominado de intensivo, é a social-democracia,
cuja base material é o Estado de Bem-estar. Sob a
égide da social-democracia houve um certo
refluxo da ideologia do liberalismo puro e simples
e algum reconhecimento das funções do Estado e
dos valores coletivos, mas com a crise de
superprodução que sobreveio após o boom da
reconstrução pós-guerra, na década de 60, esse
estágio do capitalismo entrou em crise, por sua
vez, e o capitalismo se tornou mais e mais
“ingovernável”. Na frenética busca de uma saída
que se seguiu e na qual se conceberam até o fim
da história com “novidades” tais como
neofordismo, neocolonialismo, pós-modernismo e
a própria globalização, a idéia que acabou
vingando foi a volta ao liberalismo, que agora
passa a ser neoliberalismo, como a melhor
justificativa para uma onda de privatizações e de
desmonte do Estado de Bem-Estar na tentativa de
revigorar o âmbito do mercado – pedra de toque
do capitalismo.
Esse é o contexto no qual se insere a experiência
de Londres, um dos grandes centros mundiais de
acumulação. Evidentemente, no Brasil a situação
é outra; aqui nós não fabricamos ideologia, e sim a
importamos; importamos, desse modo, liberalismo
e a social-democracia sem, no entanto, “importar”
suas bases materiais, a igualdade formal entre os
membros da sociedade, no caso do primeiro, e o
Estado de Bem-Estar, no segundo caso. Ademais,
o Brasil certamente participa na configuração do
capitalismo mundial em posição muito diferente,
quase oposta, da Inglaterra. Ressalvadas tais
diferenças, porém, a experiência de Londres no
trato das tensões surgidas com a crise do Estado
de Bem-Estar e o crescente peso da “globalização”
pode constituir valioso elemento para uma
interpretação de nossas próprias respostas e
perspectivas diante das mesmas tensões – é essa
nossa expectativa.
Csaba Deák
Doreen Massey (segunda, da esquerda para a direita) após a aula
Foto de Nuno Fonseca
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London world city in the
context of uneven development
Doreen Massey
The aim of this talk is three-fold. First to
present some empirical history about London in
the context of uneven development both
nationally within the UK and internationally.
Second to reflect theoretically on that history with
specific reference to the conceptualization of the
possibility of policy intervention at local level.
And third to present some politically engaged
commentary.
The long history of uneven development
within the United Kingdom has been dominated
by the existence of a “North-South divide” within
the country, within which London, as capital and
as headquarters of the important financial sector,
has maintained a significant dominance. But in
the 1970s “the problem of the inner cities”
emerged on to the political agenda as a major
issue. The rising levels of unemployment and
poverty in the centres of all the big cities of the
country were due predominantly to the
accelerating process of “deindustrialization” – the
loss of employment in manufacturing industry. In
this context in 1979 Margaret Thatcher, leader of
the Conservative Party, was elected to power with
a right-wing agenda of reducing the power of the
state and of pursuing an economic policy along
the then newly fashionable neoliberal lines.
Looking back this can be seen as – and is often
interpreted as – a period in which the social
democratic consensus around the welfare state,
which had been more or less hegemonic since
the end of the second world war, began to break
down. On that reading the victory of the right
marked the opening of one possible path out of
the questions raised by that breakdown.
There is much that can be said about the
policies of the new Thatcher government, but
from the point of view of the questions being
addressed here, a few points are important to
note. The combination of neoliberal economic
policy and a world economic downturn meant
that the early years saw a dramatic acceleration
of the trend in the loss of manufacturing jobs.
Both the problems of the inner cities and the
North-South divide were in consequence
exacerbated. More generally, economic inequality
increased including especially within London
(where the loss of manufacturing jobs took place
alongside the growth in size and in salaries of the
financial and associated sectors).
In this context there was very little
imaginative response from the Labour Party. The
old social democratic project seemed indeed to
have stalled. Resistance to Thatcher came
principally from two grassroots movements, very
different in social character and each with clearly
defined geographical bases. On the one hand
there was an important strike (1984-1985) in the
mining areas in the north and west. On the other
a “new urban left” came to power in a significant
number of cities. In London this was the period
of the left-led GLC with its radical experimental
politics of democracy and empowerment. On the
one hand then a white male-dominated
traditional trade-union movement; on the other a
variety of alliances of social groups and social
movements (gay and lesbian, feminist, anti-racist,
trade-union). For a brief exhilarating period there
was exciting and constructive contact between
these two very different forces and one dared to
hope that a new kind of left politics might be
born. But it ended in defeat. All the forces of
reaction were mustered against this threat: the
miners’ strike was broken and the Conservative
government simply abolished the metropolitan
level of government including the GLC.
It is important to reflect on this moment.
First, my interpretation is that this grouping of
movements represented one possible “left”
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response to the breakdown of the older social
democratic model. Second – and I think for that
very reason – the GLC in particular was hated
and feared as much by the official Labour Party
as it was by the Conservatives. Certainly they did
little to help combat its abolition. Third – and
again following on from the previous points –
there has been in subsequent years a real
attempt to destroy the good memory of this period
and thus to eradicate also a potential imaginative
resource for future action.
There followed more than a decade of
Conservative hegemony in which the response of
the Labour Party was, under the banner of
“modernization”, to move to the right and to
construct what came to be known as The Third
Way. In this it was part of an international shift,
shared for instance with Clinton in the USA,
towards a politics which accepted neoliberalism
in its economic strategy but accepted also the
need to be more active in the sphere of social
policy. (This evacuation of much of the ground
which could in any way ameliorate the worsening
position of the working class can now be seen to
be having repercussions through the space
which it has left open for far-right politics.) Within
the UK social and economic inequality were not
to be ameliorated when the Labour Party finally
was returned to government in 1997.
Among the strategies of this New Labour
government was a commitment to spatial
devolution (alongside a real unwillingness
actually to decentralize power) and a greater
attention to cities. The proposal that cities should
elect their own mayors fitted into this. The New
Labour imagination was that these would be
figureheads, often envisaged as businessmen,
who would act as transmission belts for New
Labour politics into the metropolitan areas.
London, also, was to regain a metropolitan level
of government (the Greater London Authority)
though with different and more constrained
powers than the former GLC. When the moment
came to elect the mayor the leader of the old
GLC, Ken Livingstone, put himself forward as
Labour Party candidate. He was, basically,
refused (a sign of the continuing hatred by the
Party of this radical experiment). Ken therefore
decided to stand as an independent candidate.
The New Labour Party expelled him. He won,
and the New Labour Party candidate was
defeated. The stage was set for a new period of
potentially radical experiment.
During this whole period there had also
been changes in the analysis of the possibilities
of left intervention through action in the local
state.
When the inner-city problems first came on
to the political agenda in the 1970s the
characteristic analysis promulgated in
government circles was that there must be
something “wrong” with the cities. They had
failed in the competition for jobs and thus what
was needed was area-based policies to improve
their potential. The answer to this by the left and
by progressive intellectuals was to reverse the
terms of the argument. It was not the inner cities
which had failed capitalism but capitalism which
had failed the inner cities. The cities were at the
sharp end of a more general process of
deindustrialization. In consequence it was no
good having policies based only at the urban
level; wider changes were needed at national
level too.
So when the new urban left gained control
of municipal councils in the early 1980s there
was a puzzle. Was there now more possibility of
local intervention? There were a number of
elements in the response to this. First, much of
the politics adopted in the cities, and especially
in the GLC, was exemplary and rhetorical. The
aim was to argue for alternatives and to establish
through small and symbolic interventions the fact
that an alternative politics was possible. In other
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words, if there was not the possibility fully to
address the problems of the cities nonetheless
the possibility in principle of doing so could be
established. This, then, was a politics which was
also addressed to the world beyond the cities
themselves. Second, of course, such a strategy
was particularly important and effective because
it was directed against a national government
which was Conservative. London was used,
effectively, as a “voice” against the dominant
national politics. Third, nonetheless, there was
also an analysis which attempted to establish the
possibility of effective intervention at local level.
Here the argument was that capitalism itself was
changing, away from the cost-sensitive mass
production of Fordism towards smaller-batch and
higher quality production. This was argued to be
true particularly in “First World” countries and in
their cities. Moreover such production focussed
on quality and skill rather than only on price.
Maybe, then, there was room for manoeuvre for
improving the conditions of inner-city labour
while still remaining competitive. An enormous
programme of research was set in train in order
to explore these possibilities and to work out a
strategy of “restructuring for labour” (as opposed
to restructuring for capital). The published
documents, The London Industrial Strategy, The
London Financial Strategy, and the London
Labour Strategy, stand as a monument to this
inventive period.
That is now nearly twenty years ago, and
since then it would appear that there have been
further shifts in left analyses of the possibility of
local intervention. Firstly, capitalism is less and
less imagined as a “big system” somehow “up
there” or only attackable at global level. There is
no systemic closure, far more local variety, far
more recognition of the fact that this thing called
capitalism itself only exists and is reproduced
through locally situated processes. At the same
time, secondly, space itself is conceptualized
more relationally, as being itself the constantly
shifting outcome of mobile social relations. Local
places can thus be conceptualized as specific
nodes in this wider power-geometry of social
relations which is space-time1. These two shifts in
perspective mean, thirdly, that the local and
global can be seen as more clearly mutually-
constitutive (rather than, for instance, as in
opposition). The “local place” is not a victim of
the global; rather it is one of the moments
through which the global is constituted. There is
thus some purchase, at the local level, on so-
called wider mechanisms, some possibility for
active intervention. Moreover, because different
places will represent distinct nodes of relations,
distinct positionings, within the wider power-
geometries, so the possibilities for intervention,
the degree of purchase on the constitutive social
relations, will also vary.
This perspective is particularly important in
any consideration of London as a location of local
intervention. London’s constitution as a node of
social relations within the wider power-geometries
is one of comparative relational power (in most
accounts, for example, it is one of the three
most significant “global cities”). There should, in
other words, be some leverage. If not in London,
then where?
We have then at this moment a conjunction
of two things: the re-election to power of the man
who led the radical GLC of the 1980s and a
more elaborate and promising analysis of the
possibilities of local intervention. So far however
the general strategic direction which the mayor
has adopted has been deeply disappointing. Not
only does it fail to take advantage of London’s
relative power and wealth but also, because
power brings with it responsibility, it is also failing
to take up its potential political responsibilities as
a global city.
Once again we have a new London Plan
(so far only at draft stage, and subject to further
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scrutiny – see below) and a whole set of
supporting strategies. But their central and
overwhelmingly dominant aim is that London
should maintain, and even strengthen, its
position as a global city. Moreover, and equally
significantly, the notion of “global city” is narrowly
defined in terms of finance. London’s imperial
history is to be reproduced.
Of course there are limits to what can be
done, but a radical government of a powerful city
could do more than this. The new draft London
Plan presents no critical analysis of the power
relations on which London is built. It fails in
consequence to recognize both its own power
and the subordination of other local places, and
the global inequalities, on which its own wealth
and status depend. Rather than taking
cognizance of this its analysis of “relations with
elsewhere” is pervaded by an anxiety about
competition from places which might usurp its
position. Frankfurt in particular plays this role.
[Note here – this is too big a question to pursue
– that this anxiety might be real (and then the
question becomes to what extent it might matter)
or it might be manufactured (the need to fend off
competition is the classic capitalist strategy for
getting its own way; in this case it might be being
mobilized in order to justify what is anyway a
political alliance with the financial sector).] This
lack of a full positioning of London within wider
power-geometries is one aspect of the imaginative
failure of this new plan.
But there is another, which relates to the
social and spatial dynamics within London itself.
In brief, the plan does not recognize the tensions
within London economy and society of being a
world city in this narrowly-defined financial
sense. It is above all the burgeoning of finance
which leads the rapid rise in land prices, and
which in turn is part of what precipitates the
difficulties so often experienced by other sectors
of production, manufacturing in particular. (The
success of finance, in other words, can lead to
loss of jobs in manufacturing.) Or again, right
across the metropolitan area, the spectacularly
high costs of housing – precipitated in great part
by the ridiculously high salaries in the “global
city” sectors – make the maintenance of public
services increasingly difficult (public-sector
workers can simply not afford to live in London).
The high salaries indeed are part of what lies
behind the generally higher prices and cost of
living in London than elsewhere. The point is
often made (for instance by those defending the
interests of finance) that while salaries in London
are higher than elsewhere so is the cost of living
(the implication being that the higher salaries are
therefore justifiable). This is disingenuous. For
while the higher cost of living is borne by
everyone in London the very high salaries are
received by only a minority. London is the most
unequal city in the country.
Over and over again we are told that
“London is a very successful city but it still does
have some poverty”. My analysis is quite different:
it is that the very terms of London’s success (in
particular its reliance on and promotion of
finance) are part of the reason why such serious
poverty continues to be reproduced within the
city. What is necessary, it follows, is to question
the notion of “success” on which the official
formulation relies; and this in turn implies
challenging the current central dynamic of the
economy. Consideration of the power-geometries
which construct London as it is today, both
globally beyond the city and within the
metropolitan area, in other words, points towards
a critique of the reliance on this dominant
dynamic.
There is, moreover, and as implied earlier,
“room for manoeuvre”. Even quite moderate
changes could make a difference2. Most
obviously, and most easily, the strategy could
broaden its definition of being a global city to a
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wide range of sectors beyond finance. In the
documented response to the London Plan this
point was argued by numerous organizations3.
The effect would be to shift the distributional
implications of global citydom both socially and
spatially. Moreover such a broadening could,
more politically and more radically, be extended
to the explicit promotion of elements of what has
been called “globalization from below”4.
Strategies such as those pursued by the GLC of
the 1980s, including the encouragement of
efforts towards internationalism by trade unions,
the sponsoring of fair-trade organizations, the
promotion of the internationalization of ethnic
minority businesses, and so forth, would not only
help those sectors themselves but also do
something to raise the central question – what it
might mean to be a different kind of global city.
That question should also be pursued by a more
honest and explicit recognition of its current
meaning and by attempts to resist the temptation
of endless competition by the establishment, at
the very least, of networks and collaborations
between major left-led cities.
At the moment, the London government’s
response to the poverty within the city is on the
one hand to set up other regions as the enemy
(“London has poorer boroughs than they do” etc
– a strategy the 1980s GLC refused to adopt) and
in one way or another to buy its way out of the
problem – for instance by promoting the
provision of “affordable” housing. My response is
to challenge both these strategies. On the one
hand the greatest need for redistribution is within
London itself, not from north to south within the
country. On the other hand providing “affordable”
housing, which in a market situation would
anyway be difficult to maintain as affordable, is
only to fan the flames of a dynamic of London
growth which will continue to reproduce its
problems. In that sense, and to return to the
beginning of this talk, we also have to set London
back into the context of the regional uneven
development within the nation of which it is
capital. London would be a better, more equal
(and in those terms more “successful”) city were
it to lie within a country which nationally suffered
from less interregional inequality.
Notes
(1) See, for a further explanation of this view, “A global sense of
place” In: MASSEY, D. Space, place and gender. Oxford: Polity
Press, p.146–156. 1994.
(2) Some of the policy implications are spelled out in more detail.
In: MASSEY, D., “Opportunities for a World City: reflections on
the draft economic development and regeneration strategy for
London”, City, v. 5, n.1, p. 101–105.
(3) See Spatial Development Strategy Investigative Committee:
Scrutiny of “Towards the London Plan: Initial proposals for the
Mayor’s Spatial Development Strategy”, Final Report January
2002. Greater London Authority.
(4) Here the politics links up with the arguments and experiments
being pursued through the Social Forum.
